CentrePiece Vol. 16 No. 1 by Centre for Economic Performance,
ISSN 1362-3761
C e n t r e Pi e c e
The Magazine of The Centre for Economic Performance Volume 16  Issue 1  Summer 2011
WHAT FUTURE 
FOR THE DOLLAR?
Benefits of competition Chernobyl
Youth unemployment University fees
Team performance Land use planning
The UK government’s proposed reforms
of the National Health Service are the
subject of heated debate, not just among
healthcare professionals, the media and
the wider public but even seemingly
within the cabinet itself. At the heart of
these disagreements is the desire of the
secretary of state for health to promote
greater competition among providers of
healthcare – and the equally strong desire
of his opponents to row back on the
choice and competition agenda that
began under the Labour administration.
For believers in evidence-based policy,
the dispute will be something of a
disappointment. A growing body of
research – much of it done at the Centre
for Economic Performance (CEP) –
demonstrates quite clearly that under the
right circumstances, hospital competition
provides tangible benefits. As Zack
Cooper explains in this CentrePiece, that
does not mean that everything is right
with Andrew Lansley’s bill, but it does
support the goal of making further
progress on the Blairite agenda of public
services reform.
One stream of research finds that
after greater patient choice was
introduced into the NHS in 2006,
hospitals that faced more competition
had reduced death rates and greater
efficiency. A second stream of research
shows that hospitals exposed to more
competition became much better
managed – and better-managed
hospitals have improved clinical
outcomes, lower costs and higher 
patient satisfaction.
These results chime with what CEP
researchers have found in many other
parts of the economy. Continuing this
issue’s theme of the benefits of
competition, CEP’s director John Van
Reenen describes the Centre’s long-
running research programme on
productivity growth – and how
competition drives that ultimate
measure of economic performance by
improving management practices. 
John’s article is the latest in a series
taking stock of CEP’s own performance
over the 21 years of its life so far,
looking back at the big ideas that have
emerged from the research and the
stories of their subsequent impact on
policy. The earlier surveys – covering
unemployment, inequality, social
mobility, education, the minimum 
wage and economic geography – 
are all available on the website
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/
bigideas.asp) alongside new videos of
CEP’s directors discussing growth and
inequality and of a series of 21st
birthday lectures.
Elsewhere in this magazine, there are
articles on several other topics of current
controversy in the UK, including high
levels of youth unemployment, the
trebling of university fees and planning
restrictions on supermarkets – as well as
our cover story on an issue of global
concern: the future of the dollar as the
world’s pre-eminent reserve currency.
While the facts that CEP research
uncovers may not always determine the
outcome of public policy debates, at
least the careful analysis and sifting of
evidence that lies behind them should
shed more light than heat.
Romesh Vaitilingam, Editor
romesh@vaitilingam.com
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T
he UK economy has
experienced the
worst recession since
the war in terms of
loss of output, yet
the overall
unemployment rate
is 8%, lower than the peak of the 
1980s and 1990s recessions. Youth
unemployment, however, has risen
dramatically, and because of the ‘scarring’
effects of joblessness on an individual’s later
life, has become a key policy concern. But
to tackle the problem, it is important to
understand how youth unemployment
typically responds to a cyclical downturn
and why, this time, it started to rise well
before the recession began.
Figure 1 shows the unemployment
rates for the working age population
(people aged 16 to 64) and for three
subgroups – prime age (25-49), young 
(18-24) and teenagers (16-17). The prime
age group follows the general pattern of
the aggregate labour market, but it is 
clear that the young are much more
sensitive to the state of the business cycle.
The unemployment rate is higher for the
younger groups and the magnitude of this
disadvantage widens during a recession.
This is unsurprising as employers will be
reluctant to lose more experienced workers
who have firm-specific skills and greater
redundancy costs. So the burden of
adjustment typically falls on low-wage
workers such as young people. Minorities
and the less educated also tend to fare
worse during downturns.
The fact that teenagers do not appear
to have experienced the same fall in
unemployment after the 1990s recession as
older groups can be explained by important
concealed ‘selection effects’ as increasing
numbers of teenagers without jobs stay in
education. Indeed, if instead of focusing on
unemployment figures we use information
on the proportion of young people who are
‘not in employment, education or training’
(NEETs), the trend for 18-24 year olds is
very similar to the trend in unemployment,
while there has been a decline in the 16-17
year olds NEET rate.
Has the latest recession hit young
people much worse than in the past?
Figure 1 shows that the unemployment
rate for the young has increased by more
(in absolute terms) than the
unemployment rate for older groups since
the onset of the recession. Moreover,
there has been a significant fall in hours
worked by young people compared with
older groups, while wages have flattened
or fallen for younger workers. Both of
these facts indicate that young people are
faring worse during the downturn than
other groups.
But it could be said that this has been
the general pattern in all recessions. The
Joblessness among the UK’s younger generation is
currently at very high levels, but the rise in youth
unemployment began in 2004, well before the
onset of recession. Barbara Petrongolo and 
John Van Reenen consider potential explanations.
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Figure 1:
Unemployment rates by age group, 1975-2010
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unemployment rate for young people is
about the same as at its 1990s peak and
better than the 1980s peak, despite the
fall in GDP being deeper. (The higher
absolute number of young unemployed is
due to the larger labour force and so is
not really a relevant comparison.) The
growth in youth unemployment relative to
prime age unemployment in this recession
looks no worse than in previous
recessions. In fact, if anything, it looks
slightly better. 
So the data do not suggest that there
is a special problem of youth
unemployment in this recession compared
with past experience. The fact that young
people suffer more during downturns is
quite consistent with what has happened
in previous recessions in the UK and
elsewhere. A bigger problem is what was
happening before the recession. 
Figure 1 shows that prime age
unemployment has been falling
dramatically since the early 1990s, and
then rose again in 2008. Youth
unemployment had also been falling since
the early 1990s, and by 2004 it had
dropped to about 9%, below its 1989
level. But then it started rising in 2004,
several years in advance of the recession.
So there seems to be a component of
the differential between adult and youth
unemployment that is not explained purely
by the stronger impact of cyclical
downturns on young people. Despite
several forces that may be related to the
poor performance of the youth labour
market in recent years, the bulk of the rise
in youth unemployment in the period
2004-08 remains largely unexplained.
What might be behind this increase? We
look at six possible culprits.
Rising migration
As the rise in youth unemployment dates
back to 2004, the year of the European
Union’s enlargement to take in eight
Central and Eastern European countries
(plus Cyprus and Malta), it would be
natural to think that the increase in youth
unemployment is related to stronger
competition from immigrant labour. 
The UK has experienced a record
increase in immigration in the past few
years. The proportion of foreign-born
population was below 6% in the early
1990s, but is currently about 10%. In
London, this proportion rose from 28% to
the current level of around 40%. Those
immigrants who are less skilled than
natives will be closer substitutes for
inexperienced young people and may hurt
young people more than adults. 
Some simple evidence on this can be
provided by looking at the correlation
between youth unemployment and the
migration rate across UK regions over
time, controlling for the business cycle.
Evidence shows that a one percentage
point increase in the proportion of
foreign-born in the working age
population is associated with an 
increase in youth unemployment of 
0.43 percentage points, holding the state
of the business cycle constant.
So it might be concluded that foreign
migration harms the job prospects of
young people. But this result is largely
driven by differences between London and
the rest of the country, as the capital
experienced particularly high rates of
immigration and a relatively higher
increase in unemployment. Excluding
London from the sample, the correlation
between youth unemployment and the
migration rate is basically zero.
It could be argued that the simple
correlation underestimates the impact of
migration, as immigrants will go to areas
where the labour market is strong. But we
suspect that other factors may explain this
correlation. Consistent with research
showing that immigrants do not seem to
have large harmful effects on the labour
market outcomes of natives overall (for
example, Card, 2005), there is no
compelling evidence of a strong causal
impact of higher migration on youth
unemployment. 
Changing structure of
welfare-to-work benefits
The poor showing of the youth labour
market since 2004 is particularly
disappointing given the considerable
policy reform to the Employment Service
(especially for young people) in the last
two decades. Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA)
was introduced in 1996 as the main form
of unemployment benefit and greatly
increased the job search requirements for
receiving benefits. Although it appeared to
reduce the claimant count, few of those
leaving seemed to find sustainable 
jobs: not only did JSA not seem to
improve the overall employment rate
significantly (Manning, 2009), it may 
even have reduced it for the young
(Petrongolo, 2009).
While the claimant count and
unemployment as measured by the Labour
Force Survey (LFS) were very close until
October 1996 for people over 18, LFS
unemployment (which includes people
who report that they are looking for a job
but not finding one) remained well above
the claimant count in the post-JSA period.
Thus there is evidence of increasing
Compared with the 1980s and
1990s recessions, young people
have not done particularly badly
in the latest recession
numbers of workers who left the
unemployment register but did not find
jobs. About half of the 18-24 LFS
unemployed do not claim JSA
(compared with a third of 25-49 year
olds). When dropping out of the
welfare system, individuals may become
more detached from the labour market
and spend less effort on job search. 
The second policy, the New Deal for
Young People, was introduced in 1998
with the aim of improving the incentives
for young workers to find jobs. All 18-
24 year olds on JSA for six months
received help with job search from a
dedicated personal adviser. So there was
some ‘carrot’ of job search assistance as
well as a tougher ‘stick’ of stricter
monitoring. This seemed to be
successful, rigorous evaluations showing
that job finding rates increased by
about 20% as a result of the policy
(Blundell et al, 2004; De Giorgi, 2005).
But this success was possibly
undermined when around 2004, the
Employment Service was given
incentives to focus less on young
people on JSA and relatively more on
other groups, such as lone parents and
those on incapacity benefits. Although
there is no rigorous evaluation of this
change, the timing does suggest that
this may have been a cause of the 
rise in youth unemployment before 
the recession.
A further problem is that the
increasing numbers of LFS unemployed
who are not claiming JSA separate them
from any direct effect of the New Deal
and the Employment Service in general.
There is no way for the state to give
direct help to young unemployed
people who have little contact with the
job finding agencies. An extreme
example of this is 16-17 year olds who
are not eligible for JSA so will not need
to have any direct contact with the
Employment Service.
The minimum wage
Is the National Minimum Wage another
cause of increased youth unemployment?
Although its extension in October 2004 to
cover 16-17 year olds who are not
apprentices did coincide with a strong
increase in their unemployment rate,
research has generally found few effects
of the wage floor on jobs (Machin et al,
2003; Stewart, 2004a, 2004b). For
example, the 2003 increase in the
minimum wage had insignificant
employment effects for all demographic
groups including young people (Dickens
and Draca, 2005).
Furthermore, if minimum wages were
to blame, we would expect a positive jobs
effect on teenage apprentices, who were
exempt from the 2004 legislation. In fact
the job rates of 16-17 year olds fell from
15% in early 2003 to 13% in early 2007,
casting doubt on the minimum wage
explanation.
Cohort size
Increases in the size of the youth cohort
can increase competition for jobs and, by
placing downward pressure on wages,
make employment less attractive. In fact,
the share of 18-24 year olds in the
working age population fell through to
2000, but then rose from 13% to 14.6%
by 2009. This roughly coincides with the
fall and rise of unemployment.
Our analysis shows that this 1.6
percentage point increase in cohort size
could have increased male youth
unemployment by about a quarter of a
percentage point. So this is unlikely to be
the major cause of the increase.
Falling demand for low-
skilled workers
There has been a large increase in UK
wage inequality over the last three
decades. The wage premium for being
educated has risen despite a huge increase
in the supply of college-educated workers,
which implies that there has been an
increase in the demand for skills.
This is probably due to new ‘skill-
biased’ technologies, but trade with less
developed countries like China and India
may also play some role in reducing
demand for unskilled workers. There are
similar rises in the relative demand for
skills in the United States and other
countries (Machin and Van Reenen, 2008).
A rise in demand for human capital
may disproportionately hurt the young
because they have less experience. But this
explanation is not so persuasive for
explaining the post-2004 changes, as
youth unemployment was falling in the
period 1992-2004 (and for parts of the
1980s) even in the face of this rising
demand for skill. Thus, although skill-
biased technical change has a lot to do
with longer-run trends in wage inequality,
it is not a good explanation for the rise in
youth unemployment after 2004.
Education and school-to-
work transitions
Another possible explanation is that the
quality of education for the type of young
people likely to be unemployed may have
declined. Although standards as a whole
appear to be rising, it is possible that
targets have led schools to neglect some
of the ‘hard to reach’, who may end up
unemployed. For example, an evaluation
of the Excellence in Cities programme in
disadvantaged areas finds that the policy
had a relatively high impact on high ability
pupils in poor schools, but it did not help
low ability pupils, who may have higher
unemployment risk in the future (Machin
et al, 2010). 
Similarly, the publication of league
tables gives schools incentives to focus on
pupils at the margin of achieving the
headline indicator (the percentage with
five or more A*-Cs at GCSE) but few
incentives to focus on those near the
bottom of the distribution (Wilson et al,
CentrePiece Summer 2011
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The unemployment rate is
higher for younger age groups
and this disadvantage typically
widens during a recession
2006). It is thus important that education
policies do not neglect the bottom of the
ability distribution, which is often hard to
reach. More generally, improving the
careers guidance service for school leavers
could be a way of improving the position
of young people.
Conclusions
The UK labour market has held up
relatively well so far, given the depth of
the latest recession. Young people,
however, have fared much worse than
other groups with larger increases in
unemployment and bigger falls in hours
and wages. Unfortunately, this is to be
expected as young people always suffer
worst during downturns. 
More puzzling, however, is the fact
that youth unemployment and NEET rates
were already bad going into the recession,
having been rising since 2004. The
evidence gathered to date does not
provide a firm answer to why, after 
over a decade of steady improvement,
youth unemployment started rising in the
mid-2000s.
With youth unemployment currently
around 18%, policy actions will be key to
reducing the threat of large numbers of
young people facing long-term
unemployment and the lifetime scars that
leaves. In particular, it is important to
maintain strong welfare-to-work policies
that keep young people attached to the
labour market, and to ease the transition
from school to work with apprenticeship
programmes targeted at low-achieving
groups that are typically ‘harder to reach’.
But there is no evidence that caps on
immigrant flows or a reduction in the
minimum wage would have a strong bite
on the youth labour market. 
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To what extent has the financial crisis
undermined the dollar’s pre-eminence as the
world’s reserve currency? Gianluca Benigno
explores shifting demand for dollar assets and
outlines some scenarios for the future
international role of the currency.
T
he financial crisis and its
economic consequences
have renewed debate
about the status of the
dollar as most
governments’ first
choice of currency to hold in their foreign
exchange reserves. One key reason relates
to the build-up of substantial global
macroeconomic imbalances over the past
decade, notably the US current account
deficit and the country’s swelling burden
of public debt. Maintaining the dollar’s
reserve currency status is vitally important
for the United States, allowing the country
to finance its deficits more easily.
Historically, shifts in reserve status
between currencies are not abrupt events
but occur slowly, reflecting changes in such
factors as national economic and political
influence, use in trade and investment
transactions and the deepness of domestic
financial markets. Discussions about the
dollar’s reserve status have emerged
before, following the convertibility of West
European countries’ currencies in the
1960s, the introduction of the Special
Drawing Right (SDR)* in 1969 and the
introduction of the euro in 1999.
What might be different now? Given
that the world economy has suffered its
most severe crisis since the Great
Depression, it is reasonable to ask to what
extent such an event might lead to
structural changes in the international
monetary system. These could arise as
policy authorities redesign the global
financial architecture or as a consequence
of events that lead to a reshaping of the
economic and political forces that
determine the world’s leading reserve
currencies.
Demand for dollars
So have dollars become less desirable
assets in recent years? In fact, data on the
currency composition of global foreign
exchange reserves show that there has
been very little change in the shares that
countries allocate to dollar reserves (see
Figure 1). The dollar accounts for more
than 60% of total reserves now, a higher
proportion than in 1995. 
Even looking at how this share has
changed for different groups of countries,
there is no evidence of any systematic
trend in dollar claims. At most there has
been a slow decline in dollar claims by
emerging and developing economies over
the past five years, but the dollar share
remains above 58%. The only notable
trend in the past decade has been the
rapid rise of the euro as a reserve currency,
but this has been more at the expense 
of other currencies (notably the yen) than
the dollar.
More indirect evidence on the
desirability of dollar assets comes from
data on the holdings of US Treasury
securities by China and oil-exporting
countries (see Figure 2). These show 
that despite recent events, holdings of 
US Treasuries have actually increased
markedly. 
The dollar in the 
financial crisis
What happened to the dollar during the
crisis? Data for the period from August
2007 to June 2009 show that despite
being at the epicentre of the turmoil at a
time when the solidity and stability of the
US financial system were questioned, the
CentrePiece Summer 2011
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Challenges 
for the dollar as a
reserve currency
Figure 1:
The dollar’s share of total foreign exchange reserves
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originally created to supplement US dollars within the
Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system
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dollar strengthened in value. The dollar
was on a downward trend until July 2008
as the crisis began to become a global
phenomenon. After that, the dollar started
appreciating, with peaks occurring at
times of high tension in financial markets
as its role as a ‘safe haven’ currency was
reaffirmed (see Figure 3). 
This pattern has continued during the
sovereign debt crisis in the euro area,
which began in early 2010. Peaks in
market tensions arising from the funding
needs of European countries have 
been associated with shifts towards safe
haven assets.
The preference for dollar-denominated
assets at times of high tension has also
been demonstrated by measures of the
perceived credit risk in the economy and
risk and liquidity in the money market, as
reflected in the returns on short-term US
and German bonds. During the most
acute episodes of the financial crisis, these
measures mirrored the behaviour of the
dollar, indicating that investors were
shifting towards short-term dollar assets.
The impact of current 
US policies
As financial market conditions have
improved, the sustainability of the role of
the dollar as a reserve currency has been
questioned because of concerns about the
possible consequences of current
monetary and fiscal policies for the value
of the dollar. 
From a monetary policy perspective,
the Federal Reserve has implemented rate
cuts, liquidity measures, outright asset
purchases and bailouts to mitigate a credit
crunch and avoid deflation. But now there
are worries that its actions may lead to
higher inflation. So far though, the
increase in base money that has followed
the quantitative easing programme has
not been inflationary: monetary
aggregates have not increased (money
velocity has decreased) as banks have
deposited their excess reserves with the
Fed rather than expanding credit.
From a fiscal policy perspective, the
substantial increase in the US fiscal deficit
has raised concerns about the
sustainability of the fiscal position and
repercussions for the value of the dollar
and its role as a reserve currency.
According to the Congressional Budget
Office, the fiscal deficit will amount to
about $7 trillion over the period 2012-21
with public debt rising from 53% of GDP
in 2009 to 75% in 2014. The risks
associated with the US fiscal position (at
least from the market perspective) seem to
be consistent with the weakening of the
dollar since the end of March 2009.
Nevertheless, the extent to which fiscal
factors might affect the dollar’s value will
depend on the currencies against which
the dollar could weaken. As many other
advanced countries are running
comparably large budget deficits, the
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Major foreign holdings of US Treasury securities 
in billions of dollars, 2007-10
The crisis may
have advanced
the date when
the dollar is 
no longer the
leading reserve
currency
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currencies against which the dollar might
depreciate are those of the emerging
market countries. 
In general, therefore, despite the fact
that signs of pressure might come from
current US policy stances, it seems that a
lack of alternatives, especially at the peak
of the financial crisis, has reinforced the
role of the dollar as a reserve currency. 
Challenges to the dollar
Most discussions of the reserve currency
role of the dollar have centred on the
possibility that the euro might provide a
credible competitor. But there are two
alternative challenges. The first could
come from current policy decisions that
might affect the structure of the
international monetary system. Indeed, the
Chinese authorities have proposed reviving
the role of the SDR and possibly revising
its composition by including the renminbi
in the new basket.
There is also some indication that the
Chinese would soon want to see the
renminbi used as a means of payment in
bilateral trade. China sold its first batch of
sovereign bonds in renminbi in October
2009, further signalling its intention to
make the renminbi an international
currency.
These steps are consistent with China’s
rapid growth, which resembles the
patterns of the United States and Japan
during their transformation into economic
powers in the interwar and post-war
periods. If anything, the size of the
Chinese economy relative to global GDP is
bigger now than in those comparable
situations. While the economy is still
smaller than that of the United States or
the euro area, it is expected to grow faster
than the developed economies, increasing
its global economic weight.
Nevertheless, at this stage the
renminbi lacks many of the features that
would make it desirable as a reserve
currency: there are still controls on inflows
and outflows of capital; domestic financial
markets are still underdeveloped; and the
Chinese bond market is not very liquid. 
The second challenge to the dollar
might come from post-crisis adjustments
to the system. At the heart of such
adjustments lie the role of global
imbalances and their eventual correction.
The two likely scenarios associated with
the maintenance of the status quo or
eventual corrections of the global
imbalances are crucial for understanding
the challenges for the dollar.
In the first scenario, US consumers
reduce their consumption and save to
counterbalance public sector borrowing. In
this case, a weakened dollar might provide
the source of growth for the US economy.
An orderly depreciation of the dollar
would occur as long as the Chinese
authorities are willing to accept losses in
the valuation of their current holdings of
dollar reserves.
In the second scenario, US consumers
resume their pre-crisis spending pattern.
As long as the Chinese are willing to
finance this by buying US Treasury bonds,
the system could sustain such an
arrangement at possibly higher interest
rates. But if the Chinese authorities do not
maintain the pace of such a spending
pattern by accumulating dollar assets, the
result could be a weakening of the dollar
(not necessarily orderly) coupled with a US
debt problem.
In both scenarios, a weakening of the
dollar is the likely outcome, while the
speed of the transition towards a regime
in which it is not the only reserve currency
could be accelerated, depending on the
interaction between the behaviour of US
consumers and the Chinese authorities.
So the crisis may have advanced the
date when the dollar is no longer the
leading reserve currency. From a policy
perspective, a welcome step would be to
facilitate this development by improving
the convertibility of the renminbi. At this
stage, its limited convertibility is mainly
related to the link between currency
convertibility and the development of
financial markets. Indeed, in general, a
well-developed financial market increases
the capacity of the domestic economy to
cope with factors that affect external
demand for the domestic currency.
It is not unreasonable to think that the
renminbi has the potential to play a role in
international trade and investment
transactions, given the pace at which the
Chinese economy is expanding. This could
create the necessary market discipline to
limit global imbalances by allowing for an
alternative reserve currency option. 
To sum up, while the dollar has
maintained and reinforced its reserve
currency status during the crisis, there are
elements that suggest the fragility of this
status quo. In the medium term, the
dollar’s destiny might lie more in Chinese
than in US hands. A diversification away
from the dollar and the rise of a new
international currency might imply, in the
near or medium term, a global system
with several reserve currencies, rather than
just the dollar. 
This is an edited version of ‘Challenges for
the Dollar as a Reserve Currency’ by
Gianluca Benigno, a chapter in Beyond the
Dollar: Rethinking the International
Monetary System, a Chatham House report
edited by Paola Subacchi and John Driffill
(http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/
publications/papers/view/-/id/844).
Gianluca Benigno is a reader in economics
at LSE and a research associate in CEP’s
macroeconomics and globalisation
programmes.
The rise of the
renminbi and
diversification
away from the
dollar might
imply a future
system with
several reserve
currencies
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C
EP’s mission is to
understand economic
performance and the
key indicator of that is
productivity. As Nobel
laureate and long-time
CEP associate Paul Krugman once
quipped, ‘Productivity isn’t everything, but
in the long run it is almost everything’. 
Krugman is basically right: over the
long haul, the basic determinant of
material wellbeing is the growth of wages,
which is determined by productivity
growth. If wages start to run ahead of
productivity, then the only way the
economy can adjust is through either
inflation or unemployment.
But what determines productivity, or
the amount of output that can be
produced from a given set of inputs? 
And can government policy do anything
to raise productivity? These questions 
have been explored in detail by CEP
researchers over the past two decades,
looking in particular at the roles of
competition and management. 
Does competition 
increase productivity?
In the 1990s, Stephen Nickell led a team
of CEP researchers to address the
productivity question head on. Advances
in information technology enabled him for
the first time to be able to access and
analyse accounts of many thousands of
UK firms over many decades.
The first finding was a descriptive fact
that has stood the test of time: there are
huge differences in productivity between
firms even in narrowly defined industries
that last for many years. Yet the existence
of persistently less efficient firms
encountered in Nickell’s research was hard
to square with the standard economic
model of perfect competition, which
assumed that such inefficiency could 
not persist.
A different framework was needed,
which required a more subtle view of
imperfect competition in the way firms 
set prices and workers bargain for wages
and conditions. Such a model provided 
the microeconomic foundations for 
CEP’s influential research on the
macroeconomics of unemployment 
and productivity (discussed in the first 
of our ‘big ideas’ series on welfare reform,
published in the Spring 2008 issue 
of CentrePiece).
Nickell collaborated with CEP
In the latest of CEP’s ‘big ideas’ series, John Van Reenen
sketches the evolution of the Centre’s research on the
drivers of productivity growth – and its impact on the
design of new policies in the UK and the European Union
aimed at fostering greater competition.
How competition 
improves management 
and productivity
sCentrePiece Summer 2011
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researchers Sushil Wadhwani and Charlie
Bean (all three would later become
members of the Monetary Policy
Committee) combining accounting data
with their own surveys and collecting
detailed information on the degree of
competition in product and labour
markets.
Their hunch was that tougher
competition had an important role to play
in explaining productivity differences. The
question could not be settled theoretically
as competition has ambiguous effects.
Indeed, the dominant school of thought in
growth theory was that competition
retarded growth by depressing the profits
that were the incentive to invest in
research and development.
In a series of studies culminating in
Nickell’s highly cited 1996 article, CEP
research showed that increases in
competition provided a large and
persistent boost to firm productivity.
Competition could be increased in a
number of ways: more openness to trade,
lower barriers to entry and greater
consumer choice. Governments had an
important role to play here because strong
competition policy was needed to ensure
that markets remained competitive.
Left to themselves, businesses would
frequently collude to avoid competition.
As Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth of
Nations: ‘People of the same trade seldom
meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a
conspiracy against the public or in some
contrivance to raise prices.’ 
Policy influence
Conservative governments from 1979
were keen to promote competition
through privatisation, labour market
deregulation, lower state subsidies and
reduced barriers to entry. But Prime
Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John
Major were more reluctant to strengthen
competition policy, believing that 
the market would more or less look 
after itself. 
Protecting
inefficient firms
from going under
is a major 
reason for lower
European
productivity
As Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Gordon Brown was far keener on
toughening competition policy. CEP’s
influence was important in the 1998
Competition Act and 2002 Enterprise Act,
which increased penalties for cartels, 
de-politicised the merger regime and
increased resources available for the
beefed-up competition authorities – the
Competition Commission and the Office
of Fair Trading. 
A paper I co-authored with Nickell
summarised what we knew about Britain’s
productivity gap, and we were both active
in promoting the importance of
competition to policy-makers at home and
abroad (Nickell and Van Reenen, 2002).
For example, I gave much evidence to
support the European Union’s Services
Directive, which sought to open up
European markets in the heavily regulated
service sector.
CEP research also tried to get a better
handle on why competition could foster
productivity. In one study, we showed that
competition on average promoted
innovation through looking directly at over
3,000 major UK innovations since the war
(Blundell et al, 1999). 
In another study, CEP psychologist
Michael West and colleagues had some
fascinating findings on how competitive
shocks to firms are often bad news for
managers but spur them into making
organisational changes that improve
performance. Their in-depth econometric
case studies suggested that management
mattered (Dawson et al, 1999). 
But what about the bosses? 
In the 2000s, Nicholas Bloom and I built
on the insight that firms’ internal
organisation was the key to productivity
by launching a major effort to measure
management and organisation within
firms (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007).
We worked with leading international
management consultancies to build a
scoring grid that measured management
across a range of key dimensions on lean
operations, monitoring, targets and people
management. Our team of MBA students
has now interviewed around 10,000 firms
in 20 countries to get a robust picture of
management around the world (see
http://worldmanagementsurvey.org). 
It turns out that the original intuition
of the 1990s work was right:
management really does matter in
explaining productivity differences. And
furthermore, a key factor in boosting
management quality in both the private
and public sectors is competitive intensity.
This worked not only within firms, as
Nickell emphasised, but also between
firms. In other words, competition raises
CentrePiece Summer 2011
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John Van Reenen is director of CEP.
Further reading
Nicholas Bloom and John Van Reenen (2007)
‘Measuring and Explaining Management
Practices Across Firms and Nations’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4):
1351-408 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0716.pdf)
Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith and John
Van Reenen (1999) ‘Market Share, Market
Value and Innovation: Evidence from British
Manufacturing Firms’, Review of Economic
Studies 66(3): 529-54 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
textonly/people/vanreenen/papers/
marketshare.pdf)
Jeremy Dawson, Stephen Nickell, Michael
Patterson and Michael West (1999) 
‘The Effectiveness of Top Management
Groups in Manufacturing Organisations’, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 436 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
pubs/download/DP0436.pdf)
Stephen Nickell (1996) ‘Competition and
Corporate Performance’, Journal of Political
Economy 104: 724-46
Stephen Nickell and John Van Reenen (2002)
‘Technological Innovation and Economic
Performance in the United Kingdom’, in
Richard Nelson, Benn Steil and David Victor
(eds) Technological Innovation and Economic
Performance (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/dp0488.pdf)
John Van Reenen (2010) ‘Does Competition
Raise Productivity through Improving
Management Practices?’, CEP Discussion
Paper No. 1036 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/dp1036.pdf)
2. 
Managementia 
Inefficienta
(Threatened)
2. 
The quality 
of firms’
management
plays a key
role in
explaining
productivity
differences
average productivity in a nation through a
Darwinian selection effect where the low
productivity firms are driven out of the
market and the high productivity firms
expand (Van Reenen, 2010).
This is illustrated in Figure 1, which
compares the distribution of management
scores (from 1=terrible to 5=global best
practice) in the United States, which is the
highest scoring nation, to the UK. The
main reason for the UK’s lower score is not
that every US firm is better than all UK
firms, but rather that we have a ‘long tail’
of very badly managed firms.
This management analysis has
influenced many policy-makers. For
example, after presenting it to the
European Commission’s President Barroso, I
helped to advise on redrafting the rules for
state aid. Protecting inefficient firms from
going under is a major reason for lower
European productivity. The direction of
policy is to make space for the more
efficient firms to grow and prosper.
Conclusions
Two decades of CEP research on the
impact of competition on productivity
reveal many lessons for policy. First, a focus
on collecting and analysing data is better
than just theorising. A policy-maker will be
much more influenced by some solid facts
than an abstract theory.
Second, guarding and enforcing
competition will not happen automatically
in markets but requires vigilance from
governments in many policy areas. Often
raising productivity is better accomplished
by taking away barriers to competition (for
example, by reforming regulations on
planning) than simply spending more
money on government schemes. This
should be some crumb of comfort to
policy-makers in an age of budget
austerity.
Competition will not
happen automatically in
markets but requires
vigilance from governments
in many policy areas
CentrePiece Summer 2011
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If competition is good for the private sector, as the previous article suggests, is
it also good for the public sector? Zack Cooper outlines the evidence from
CEP research on competition in healthcare – and the implications for the
coalition government’s NHS reform plans.
Competition in the public sector:
good for the goose,
good for the gander?
Can allowing hospitals to compete prompt them to
improve their clinical performance? Do hospitals facing
more competition really take steps to become more
efficient? These were the central questions that my
colleagues and I set out to answer empirically by looking
at recent NHS reforms that aimed to expand patient
choice and encourage hospital competition.
It is almost universally accepted that in the private sector,
competition is a good thing. But in public services such as
healthcare and education, introducing competition has
always been controversial. Indeed, some of the most
raucous political debates in the United States have centred
on increasing school choice, and debates over hospital
competition in the UK get equally fierce.
In our research, the goal was simple. We wanted to
sidestep the rhetoric, ignore the politics and examine
whether introducing patient choice and provider
competition into the NHS led to positive change. After
looking at millions of patient outcomes over a span of
eight years, we did indeed find that competition between
hospitals prompted the providers to raise their game. 
Our first study examined whether hospitals facing more
competition lowered their heart attack death rates more
quickly than hospitals located in monopoly markets
(Cooper et al, 2010a). We found that after competition
was introduced into the NHS in 2006, hospitals facing
greater competition decreased mortality rates about a
third of a percentage point more quickly than monopoly
providers. Considering that average mortality rates at
hospitals are about 12%, that’s a non-trivial difference –
the equivalent of approximately 300 fewer lives lost a year
from heart attacks alone. 
In a second study, we examined whether competition in
the NHS prompted hospitals to become more efficient
(Cooper et al, 2010b). We measured patients’ length of
stay in hospital for an elective hip replacement in terms of
two key components: the time from a patient’s admission
until their surgery; and the time from surgery to discharge.
While the latter component is heavily influenced by
patients’ characteristics, the former is a direct function of
a hospital’s efficiency. Our analysis showed that hospitals
facing greater competition lowered their pre-surgery
length of stay relative to monopoly providers, but they
were not significantly different on the post-surgery length
of stay. We therefore concluded that in the face of greater
competition, hospitals improved their efficiency without
discharging patients ‘sicker and quicker’.
Other CEP research illustrates the possible mechanism
through which competition may be prompting hospitals to
improve (Bloom et al, 2010). This study found that better
managed hospitals in England had better outcomes for
patients and were more cost-effective. What’s more,
greater competition actually prompted hospitals to
improve their management performance.
What does all this mean for the future provision of public
services? As in the private sector, competition in the public
sector can create meaningful incentives for providers and
better results for patients. So policy-makers should take
steps to encourage hospitals to compete and lift the
protections that have historically been afforded to under-
performing providers, which, all too often, have allowed
them to continue to prosper. 
in brief...
Competition
between hospitals
has raised 
efficiency and
improved patient
outcomes
But increasing competition does not necessarily mean
reducing regulation. Particularly in healthcare markets,
where quality is difficult to measure and the asymmetry of
information between patients and professionals is
pervasive, the government still needs to play an active role
ensuring that these markets operate effectively. This
means regulating minimum standards, only allowing price
competition in certain sectors and working tirelessly to
publish and promote measures of provider performance.
How does this evidence fit with the coalition government’s
proposals for NHS reform? I firmly believe that while
giving GPs a larger role in purchasing decisions in the NHS
certainly makes sense, the government’s proposal for GP
consortia is likely to reduce competition rather than
increase it.
Strong markets require strong purchasers that have the
skills and inclination to promote competition, differentiate
between providers and seek the most productive care for
their patients, rather than simply the least expensive.
Unfortunately, this is a combination of skills that I do not
believe GPs in England have at present, and it is one that
will take the nascent GP consortia a significant amount of
time to develop.
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Zack Cooper is a research economist in CEP’s
productivity and innovation programme.
Further reading
Nicholas Bloom, Carol Propper, Stephan Seiler
and John Van Reenen (2010) ‘The Impact of
Competition on Management Quality:
Evidence from Public Hospitals’,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 983
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0983.pdf)
Zack Cooper, Stephen Gibbons, Simon Jones
and Alistair McGuire (2010a) ‘Does Hospital
Competition Save Lives? Evidence from 
the English NHS Patient Choice 
Reforms’, LSE Health Working Paper No.
16/2020 (http://www2.lse.ac.uk/
LSEHealthAndSocialCare/LSEHealth/pdf/
Workingpapers/WP16.pdf)
Zack Cooper, Stephen Gibbons, Simon Jones
and Alistair McGuire (2010b) ‘Does Hospital
Competition Improve Efficiency? An Analysis
of the Recent Market-based Reforms to the
English NHS’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 988
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0988.pdf)
The government’s proposal
for GP consortia is likely to
reduce competition rather
than increase it
On 26 April 1986, engineers at the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant in Ukraine began a series of tests on one of
the reactors, which led to the world’s worst civil nuclear
disaster. The amount of radiation released was far greater
than from the Hiroshima or Nagasaki atomic bombs,
hitherto the source of most of our knowledge about the
effects of radiation fallout. As yet, the amount of radiation
released and the areas affected by fallout from Fukushima
are lower than at Chernobyl. 
Much has been written about the medical and physical
consequences of Chernobyl, but less attention has been
given to the social and economic consequences of the
disaster. Poor health and people’s perceptions of their
health can potentially influence their fertility, marriage
behaviour or educational attainment, as well as the key
labour market outcomes of wages, hours of work and
employment. 
Our research examines the relationship between people’s
exposure to radiation as a result of the Chernobyl
accident and their subsequent health and economic
performance 20 years later. We analyse the Ukrainian
Longitudinal Monitor Survey, which in 2003, 2004 and
2007 collected self-reported health and socio-economic
data from a representative sample of working age
individuals.
The data set allows us to establish the place of residence
of respondents at the time of the Chernobyl accident.
This is important because there was widespread variation
in the amount of radiation areas received. Some parts of
Ukraine received little more radiation than normal
background levels, while others received more than ten
times the usual background level dosage.
The Chernobyl accident
carries a long-lasting
legacy for many
residents of Ukraine
CentrePiece Summer 2011
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Chernobyl: the long-term health
and economic consequences
Recent events in Fukushima have reawakened public anxiety about the
consequences of a major accident at a nuclear power plant. Hartmut Lehmann
and Jonathan Wadsworth assess the long-lasting effects of radiation exposure
from the Chernobyl disaster on the health and labour market performance of the
people of Ukraine.
in brief...
The first step of our analysis is to establish whether there
is a link between local radiation levels and the list of
illnesses reported in the survey. The second step is to see
whether this radiation dose itself is correlated with other
socio-economic outcomes over the next 20 years. Finally,
we explore whether the radiation dose is an indicator of
the effect of health on a range of labour market and
income-generating outcomes that are important for daily
life in Ukraine.
While the long latency period of many radiation-related
illnesses means that it is important to take a long-run
view of the consequences of the accident, equally Soviet
secrecy about it and the lack of general awareness of the
effects of radiation created a fertile ground for persistent
fears and rumours attributing any health problem to
Chernobyl. So perceptions may have changed as a result
and perceptions can have a powerful influence on
individual actions. As such, our research is an attempt to
identify a causal effect of the accident on both health
outcomes and health perceptions.
Our results suggest that the Chernobyl accident carries a
long-lasting legacy for many residents of Ukraine, notably
because of its effect on their perceptions of their health.
To this day, more than half of the adult Ukrainian
population appears to be still concerned over the
consequences of this event. And one in six prime age
Ukrainian adults report being in poor health, a much
higher figure than comparable estimates from many
western industrialised countries.
There is also a significant positive association between
residence in radiation-affected areas at the time of the
accident and self-assessed poor health. Adults living in
areas considered to have received sufficiently high
radiation fallout as to be continually monitored are 
up to 12 percentage points more likely to report being in
poor health. 
But there is a less obvious manifestation of such an effect
on a variety of specific self-reported health conditions or
measures associated with stress, such as drinking,
smoking or weight problems, relative to others living in
areas less affected by the radiation fallout. Only the
Chernobyl liquidators (the volunteers and in some cases
the conscripts brought in to try to contain and mop up
the radiation leak in the immediate vicinity of the plant),
who were much more exposed to radiation than other
members of the population, appear to have experienced
more long-term health problems.
So it seems that the main long-term health effect of
Chernobyl for the majority of the current adult
population may be working through perceptions of poor
health. At the same time, there do appear to be
significant associations with Chernobyl-related residence
and subsequent labour market performance. Those more
exposed to Chernobyl-induced radiation have 
significantly lower levels of employment and working
hours 20 years on.
While there is also little evidence from the data that
residence in a contaminated zone has influenced fertility,
marriage behaviour or educational attainment, there is
some evidence to suggest that mobility may be reduced
among those living in areas that received higher doses of
radiation in 1986. In this way, it may be harder to argue
that poor health perceptions are the sole channel through
which the legacy of Chernobyl manifests itself. 
The lessons for Fukushima may be that while, as in
Chernobyl, the area immediately surrounding the plant is
likely to be isolated for years to come, individual
perceptions are likely to be affected over a much wider
area for a lengthy period of time – and this may have
economic consequences.
CentrePiece Summer 2011
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This article summarises ‘The Impact of Chernobyl on Health
and Labour Market Performance’ by Hartmut Lehmann and
Jonathan Wadsworth, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1052
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1052.pdf).
Hartmut Lehmann is a professor of economics at the
University of Bologna. Jonathan Wadsworth is a professor of
economics at Royal Holloway, University of London, and a
senior research fellow in CEP’s labour markets programme.
One in six prime
age Ukrainian
adults report being
in poor health, a
much higher
proportion than 
in comparable
countries
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The cap on tuition fees will rise to £9,000 in
2012. In the third of our series on policies of the
coalition government, Gill Wyness describes
evidence on the impact of past fee increases on
young people’s decisions to go to university.
Fees and loathing:
the impact of higher
education finance on
university participation
CentrePiece Summer 2011
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T
he question of how to
finance higher education
has been on the agenda of
successive UK governments
since the 1960s. During
that time, the country has moved from a
situation where the taxpayer footed the
entire bill for higher education to a system
where graduates make a contribution to
part of the cost of their education. This
so-called ‘cost-sharing’ has always been a
subject of controversy, with fears that it
would lower participation, particularly
among young people from poor
backgrounds.
The recent announcement that the
tuition fee cap – currently set at £3,300 a
year – will be allowed to rise to £9,000 
a year from 2012 has been met with
opposition from a number of camps,
including the media, the National Union of
Students, parents and the students
themselves who took to the streets in their
masses. But what is the likely outcome of
this almost threefold increase in fees?
Tuition fees were first introduced by
the Labour government in the UK in 1998.
They were payable upfront and means-
tested according to parental income, up to
a maximum of £1,000 per year. Grants
were subsequently abolished (having been
gradually phased out over the 1990s), and
replaced by maintenance loans.
A further major reform in 2006 saw
upfront fees abolished and replaced by a
deferred £3,000 fee – payable by all
regardless of parental income but fully
covered by a fee loan with quite generous
terms. The loan is interest free and only
payable after graduation (at a rate of 9%
of earnings once the graduate is earning
£15,000 or more), and all loans are
written off after 25 years. Grants were
also increased at this time (having been
reintroduced in 2004) and maintenance
loans extended.
Despite the fevered debate that has
surrounded tuition fees, to date there has
been very little investigation of their
impact on participation. Our research used
information on higher education finance
and participation between 1992 and 2007
– a period in which many reforms of
higher education finance took place – to
analyse the impact of tuition fees, grants
and loans on participation (Dearden et al,
2010).
Our results show that increases in
tuition fees have a small but significant
impact on participation of 3.3 percentage
points per £1,000 increase. But the
negative effect of fees can be offset by
increases in loans and grants, which have
small positive impacts on participation of
around 2 percentage points each.
So what can this tell us about the
forthcoming increase in tuition fees?
Unfortunately, the answer is not
straightforward. Our research looked at
relatively small increases in fees – between
zero and £1,000; and between £1,000
and £3,000 – while the reforms could see
fees rise to as much as £9,000 per year.
It is unlikely that our results would still
hold when applied to these substantial
increases. But our results do indicate that
fee increases have a negative effect on
participation, contradicting recent media
speculation that higher education is a
‘Giffen good’, which people paradoxically
consume more of as the price rises.
The results also indicate that there is
an important role for grants and loans in
encouraging young people to go to
university – so the government’s continued
investment in the grant and loan system 
is welcome. 
We have also looked at the likely
distributional impact of the 2012 reforms
on graduates, students, universities and
the taxpayer (Chowdry, Dearden and
Wyness, 2010). In this study, we used
lifetime earnings simulations for future
graduates created by researchers at the
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS). These
earnings profiles allow us to look at the
impact of reforms on the distribution of
graduates, by calculating graduates’ fee
and maintenance loan repayment
schedules under the new system.
Figure 1 shows the lifetime fee and
maintenance loan repayments of
graduates from different parts of the
income distribution, comparing
repayments under the current system to
repayments under the new system. In each
case, we assume that graduates take out a
fee and maintenance loan for each of 
the three years of their studies – with the
fee loan assumed to be £7,500 under the
new system.
The major
influence on
whether young
people go to
university is not
the fees that they
face but their
prior educational
attainment
We use the £7,500 figure for
illustrative purposes, though given
substantial cuts to the universities
teaching budget, many universities would
have to charge at least this amount to
break even. Indeed, the majority of
universities have chosen to charge close
to £9,000 per year.
As Figure 1 shows, the new system is
progressive: graduates who do well in the
labour market – those at the top of the
lifetime earnings distribution – repay
significantly more over their lifetimes
than those at the bottom of the earnings
distribution.
In both the current and new 
system, the repayment arrangements
protect low-earning graduates, many of
whom will repay only a small proportion
of their loan before it is written off. Low-
earning graduates will actually be better
off under the new system, largely
because the earnings threshold above
which graduates have to start repaying
their loans will be increased to £21,000
under the new system.
But will young people bear this in
mind when deciding whether or not to
participate in higher education? Or will
the prospect of graduating from
university with fee and maintenance loan
debts of as much as £40,000 dissuade
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Figure 2:
University participation by socio-economic position and UCAS points achieved (2004/05)
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bright young people, particularly those
from poor backgrounds who may be
particularly debt-averse?
An IFS study of participation in higher
education by young people from different
backgrounds suggests not (Chowdry,
Crawford et al, 2010). Figure 2 shows the
proportion of young people who
participate in university, comparing those
from different backgrounds (measured by
socio-economic position) but with the
same A-level scores.
Young people with 301 or more
UCAS points (three good A-levels) have a
high probability of going to university,
regardless of their background. In
2004/05, roughly nine out of ten young
people with those results participated in
higher education at age 18/19, with
those from poorer backgrounds just as
likely to participate as those from richer
backgrounds. Meanwhile, young people
with no UCAS points have a very low
probability of going to university
regardless of their socio-economic
background. 
This research clearly shows that while
tuition fees, grants and loans may have a
small impact on participation, the major
factor in whether young people will go to
university is not the fees that they face,
but their prior educational attainment.
This is where background does matter
since young people from poor
backgrounds are extremely unlikely to
achieve the necessary A-level results to
obtain a place at university. Only 3% of
young people from the poorest
backgrounds achieved 301 or more UCAS
points in 2004 compared with 25% of
young people from the richest
backgrounds. 
Of course, it may be that young
people have decided not to go to
university anyway, perhaps put off by
tuition fees, and therefore put less effort
into achieving high A-level scores.
Nevertheless, the evidence to date
strongly suggests that higher education
finance has had a limited role to play in
participation. But given the substantial
increase in tuition fees from 2012, we
cannot be confident that this will
continue to be the case.
Gill Wyness is a research officer in CEP’s
education and skills programme.
Further reading
Haroon Chowdry, Lorraine Dearden and Gill
Wyness (2010) ‘Higher Education Reforms:
Progressive but Complicated with an
Unwelcome Incentive‘, Institute for Fiscal
Studies (IFS) Briefing Notes No. 113
(http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/5366)
Haroon Chowdry, Claire Crawford, Lorraine
Dearden, Alissa Goodman and Anna Vignoles
(2010) ‘Widening Participation in Higher
Education: Analysis using Linked
Administrative Data’, IFS Working Paper 
No. W10/04 (http://www.ifs.org.uk/
publications/4951)
Lorraine Dearden, Emla Fitzsimons and Gill
Wyness (2010) ‘The Impact of Higher
Education Finance on University
Participation’, Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills Research Paper No. 11
(http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/479/)
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n a team-based enterprise, is
output maximised by attracting
individuals with the largest
aggregate endowment of skills
without regard to their effect
on the distribution of skills
within the team? Phil Jackson, former
coach of US basketball team the Chicago
Bulls and one of professional sport’s most
successful managers, illustrates the
importance of this question: 
‘The real reason the Bulls won six NBA
championships in nine years is that we
plugged into the power of oneness
instead of the power of one man. Sure,
we had Michael Jordan, and you have to
credit his talent. But at the other end of
the spectrum, if players 9, 10, 11, and 12
are unhappy because Michael takes 25
shots a game, their negativity is going to
undermine everything. It doesn’t matter
how good individual players are – they
can’t compete with a team that is awake
and aware and trusts each other.’
Our research asks whether there is an
optimal spread of talent that maximises
performance. Specifically, we consider
whether it is optimal for managers to
assemble teams solely on the basis of
average ability (irrespective of the effect
this may have on the distribution of skills)
or whether organisations should manage
selection so as to prevent too wide a gap
opening up between the best and poorest
performers.
Our analysis is based on annual
performance and biographical data from
the history of US major league baseball,
1920-2009. As individual performance
measures, we use earned run average
(ERA) for pitchers and on-base plus
slugging percentage (OPS) for hitters. A
low ERA or a high OPS indicates a good
player.
In baseball terms, the question we
want to answer is if the manager is forced
to choose two players whose average
ability is the same (for example, a
combined historical batting average of
0.275), is it better to approximate the
average more closely (0.270 and 0.280
respectively) or should one star (0.325)
and one less able player (0.225) be hired?
And at what point would too large or too
narrow a spread in ability be damaging to
team chemistry and performance?
As might be expected, our research
shows that teams with higher average
talent are more successful: the
higher/lower the average OPS/ERA of the
players, the greater the winning
percentage of the team. More surprisingly,
we find that baseball teams assembled at
Talent is essential for team success in any
setting – but is performance harmed if there is
too wide a gap between the skills of an
organisation’s stars and the rest? Alex Bryson
and colleagues analyse data on US major league
baseball to investigate how the distribution of a
team’s talent affects its overall performance.
Team performance 
and the optimal spread of
talent: evidence from 
US major league baseball
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the start of a season with either too large
or too small a degree of inequality in OPS
or ERA underperform relative to teams
with more intermediate skill distributions.
In other words, there is the inverse U-
shaped pattern depicted in Figure 1,
where skill dispersion and team output are
positively related up to region A-B, after
which, in the region of high skill
dispersion, B-C, the relationship turns
negative. The implication is that a team’s
winning percentage is not highest where
skill dispersion is highest, but rather at
point B, where heterogeneous ability is
moderate.
These findings suggest that teams
with a healthy balance of stars and players
on their way to becoming stars (and
perhaps even older players with declining
productivity but who provide experience)
The idea of 
an optimal
distribution 
of ability is
relevant in
any setting
where output
depends on
teamwork
Figure 1:
Hypothetical relationship between skill dispersion and team performance
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outperform teams with extremely equal or
extremely unequal skill distributions. Yet
most teams have levels of inequality
greater than the estimated optimum,
implying that they would benefit from a
reduction in skill dispersion. 
What might explain the inverse 
U-shaped pattern? Below a certain level of
heterogeneity, we contend that players do
not benefit from the assistance and
motivation resulting from playing
alongside teammates with complementary
skills and greater talent. Beyond a certain
level of heterogeneity, however, further
increases in the variance of talent can
allow opposing teams to exploit the
weaknesses of lower-performing players.
This could be the case if better players
are either unwilling to help their
teammates or if they are simply unable to
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This article summarises ‘Heterogeneous
Worker Ability and Team-based Production:
Evidence from Major League Baseball, 1920-
2009’ by Alex Bryson, Kerry Papps and Rafael
Gomez, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1015
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp1015.pdf) and just published in Labour
Economics 18: 310-19.
Alex Bryson of the National Institute of
Economic and Social Research is a visiting
research fellow in CEP’s labour markets
programme. Kerry Papps is a fellow of
Nuffield College, Oxford. Rafael Gomez is at
the University of Toronto and was a research
associate in CEP’s now completed programme
on the future of trade unions.
do so because the talent gap is too wide.
And while baseball is more a game of
individuals and requires less on-the-field
interaction than sports like basketball and
football, team performance still depends
in large measure on who precedes or
follows a player in the pitching rotation or
batting order.
Baseball players are often called on to
make ‘sacrifices’ by their managers so that
other players will profit and the team will
succeed. For example, a hitter might be
told to tire an opposing pitcher out by
‘fouling off’ balls or a pitcher might be
asked to ‘walk’ a hitter intentionally. We
believe that such self-sacrificing behaviour
is strengthened by having skill distributions
that are neither too wide nor too narrow. 
Can these results be generalised
beyond baseball? We believe that
wherever workers have to perform their
tasks in a setting where there is a single
product or ultimate output measure, the
idea of an optimal distribution of worker
ability is likely to be relevant even if, as in
baseball, workers may be co-operating
only indirectly. Such work environments
are common and include areas as diverse
as consultancy, academic departments,
complex legal cases, film sets, space
missions and most restaurants. 
The task of a manager in these
settings is not simply to hire individual
workers with the best talent money can
buy or to hire a star and allow the rest of
a team to catch up. Rather, it is as
important to look at the effect that hiring
someone will have on the dispersion of
ability. In cases where work is highly
interdependent and resources for the firm
are constrained, it may even be best to
look at distributional concerns first and
absolute ability second.
Our findings reinforce what good
organisations seem to do every day: select
the best group of workers possible and
harness their collective potential by being
as attentive to the distribution of skills as
In large
organisations,
a surfeit of star
talent may
prevent the
formation of a
well-functioning
team
to the average ability. But an obvious
question is why, just as in many of the
baseball teams in our sample, so many
organisations fail to attain the ideal
distribution of talent?
In small organisations or teams, this
may be because managers are simply
unable to acquire the best talent: they may
have a workforce with a very similar range
of ability but not enough star talent to pull
up overall production. Conversely, in large
firms with few limitations on finding and
developing the best staff, a surfeit of star
talent may prevent the formation of a well-
functioning team.
Baseball teams with too large
or too small a spread of talent
underperform relative to
teams with intermediate 
skill distributions
E
lementary economics
teaches that there are
three factors of production
– land, labour and capital
– yet the importance of
the first input is all too frequently
neglected. Nowhere is that more evident
than in the UK’s system of land use
planning, in which a scarce resource is
allocated without any regard for markets
or prices. Indeed, price information is
explicitly excluded from decisions about
land use, so it is only after the supply of
land is allocated to each use that the
price is set in markets.
But as the government seems to
recognise in its commitment ‘to reform
the planning system radically and
fundamentally’ (HM Treasury/BIS, 2011),
rationing land use in this way has a
significant impact on efficiency and
growth, imposing substantial costs on
households and businesses. Given the
present goal of economic growth with
fiscal rectitude, reforming our system of
land use planning is almost certainly the
simplest, the cheapest and the most
effective route to freeing up the supply
side of the economy.
Of course, the planning system does
have significant benefits, mainly in the
form of open space in cities and the
separation of industry from residential
Land use planning:
the damaging impact on retail productivity
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When resources are allocated without regard to price, as
with UK land use regulation, the consequences are often
bad for business and consumers. Paul Cheshire,
Christian Hilber and colleagues find that the restrictions
that planning policies impose on retail development have
significantly reduced the productivity of supermarkets.
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areas. But our research has shown that
even allowing for the value produced by
the system, in prosperous and tightly
constrained south east England, the
restriction of land supply for housing
generates a substantial net loss for
society – equivalent to a tax of nearly
four pence in the pound (Cheshire and
Sheppard, 2002).
More recently, we have shown that
restrictions on office building have led, at
the extreme, to an increase in costs
equivalent to an 800% tax on the
marginal costs of construction. Even
depressed provincial cities, such as
Birmingham, have an average equivalent
tax on the marginal costs of construction
of 250%. As would be expected, building
costs in Birmingham are only about half
of those in Manhattan, but total
occupation costs are 44% higher
(Cheshire and Hilber, 2008).
Our latest research focuses on the
retail sector, where we have had access
to a uniquely rich data set for one of the
major supermarket chains. Merging
detailed information on each store with
other spatial data (such as the distance to
competing stores, local population and
car ownership density), we can estimate
the contribution of space to each store’s
productivity. As expected, it is highly
significant: bigger stores are considerably
more productive.
The next step was to measure the
impact of planning, where restrictions on
retail development have tightened since
1988. Fortunately for our research
strategy, this happened sooner and much
more restrictively in England than in
Scotland, Northern Ireland or even Wales.
In England from 1988, policy tried to
control not just the area of land available
for retail development but where
development should take place at a
micro-level.
This policy was tightened further in
1996, when a ‘town centre first’ policy
was introduced. The new policy forced
would-be developers to show first that
the local area ‘needed’ more shopping
space (‘need’ being defined in legalistic
not economic terms) and then to pass a
‘sequential test’. Developers had to
demonstrate that for any proposed
development, there was no ‘suitable’ site
in the town centre (again with ‘suitable’
defined in legalistic terms). 
To be ‘suitable’, a site had to have
been identified in the Local Development
Plan (though only a minority of local
authorities have such a plan) and to be in
the designated town centre. That the site
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Planning policies
in England have
reduced
supermarket
productivity by
at least 20% –
which means
higher prices
Figure 1:
Productivity by year of opening:
controlled for all other factors
was owned by a competing retailer did
not make it ‘unsuitable’. Thus the
planning system was ‘micro-managing’
the location – even the specific sites – for
development and effectively prohibiting
out-of-town superstores.
Analysing our store level data
revealed a striking pattern related to the
date at which a store was opened.
Controlling for all other factors,
productivity increased over the first 
20 years from the oldest stores to 
those established in the late 1980s 
(see Figure 1).
But for stores established after the
late 1980s, productivity fell so that in the
most recently established stores,
productivity was actually lower than in
the oldest stores of all. Even more
revealing was that this relationship only
existed for stores in England, where the
micro-management of specific locations
had started in 1988 and had been much
more vigorously enforced.
A second route by which planning
policies might reduce retail productivity is
through overall restrictiveness. A local
authority that restricts development more
tightly may raise the price of all types of
development, including the price of retail
space. If land prices are raised, stores will
tend to be smaller and so less productive. 
We had data on planning decisions
for all English local authorities since
1979, which could be used as a measure
of local restrictiveness. Careful analysis of
this data (taking account of the possibility
that if a local authority is known to be
particularly restrictive, potential
developers may not apply in the first
place) confirmed that stores are smaller
where planning policy is more restrictive
and enabled us to quantify the
relationship reliably.
Together these results allow us to
estimate a lower bound impact of land
use planning on supermarket
productivity. It is lower bound because it
is conservative to assume that without
the town centre first policy, productivity
would have continued to grow only at
the rate between 1966 and 1986: for
example, US retail productivity growth
accelerated sharply in the 1990s. 
But making that assumption implies that
the town centre first policy reduced
supermarket productivity in England 
by 16%.
It is equally conservative to assume
that even in the least restrictive English
local authority, policies restricting the
supply of urban land had no impact on
the costs of retail space. But if we
attribute the reduction in productivity
associated with the reduction in store
sizes resulting from the variation in
restrictiveness between the most and
least restrictive local authorities, then this
contributed a further 4.2% reduction to
supermarket productivity. Putting it
another way, productivity ‘would’ 
have been 4.2% higher if all local
authorities had been as unrestrictive as
the least restrictive.
Overall, therefore, it seems that on
the most conservative assumptions,
planning policies in England have
reduced retail productivity by more than
20%. Lower productivity entails higher
prices – and since poorer households
spend a larger proportion of their
incomes in supermarkets, this probably
hits poorer households harder than 
richer ones.
This is a separate effect from that
diagnosed by Raffaella Sadun and
described in the autumn 2008 issue of
CentrePiece. Her study finds that the
policy of prohibiting out-of-town
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Poorer
households
spend a larger
share of their
incomes in
supermarkets
and will be hit
harder by lower
productivity
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superstores has reduced town centre
employment in retail because the
supermarkets’ response has been to
divert their investment into ‘locals’ and
‘metros’, thereby eliminating more
traditional retailers.
The 20% reduction in retail
productivity that our study finds is a
measure of the gross costs to the
economy. It is possible that there are
benefits generated by such restrictive
policies. In the next stage of this
research, we intend to quantify the
effects of planning policies on the carbon
footprint of the retail sector. Reduced
energy use is one of the main benefits
claimed for town centre first policies,
based on the assertion that they promote
‘linked trips’, thus reducing overall travel.
But it is by no means clear that the
evidence will show a reduction in net
carbon use. With continued
decentralisation of urban populations,
people may have become separated from
supermarkets, not only extending their
trips but forcing them into more
congested conditions. Equally, restocking
of supermarket shelves may have become
more energy-intensive with a larger
number of smaller lorries operating in
more congested conditions.
Another issue where it is essential to
examine the evidence rigorously is the
significant ageing of the stock of retail
buildings that is driven by the restrictions
on new retail developments. Of the
current stock of stores, 90% were built
before 1980 and 70% before 1940.
Needless to say, old buildings are far less
energy efficient than new ones.
Addressing such questions of energy
efficiency will form the next stage of our
research.
This article summarises ‘Evaluating the
Effects of Planning Policies on the Retail
Sector: Or do Town Centre First Policies
Deliver the Goods?’ by Paul Cheshire,
Christian Hilber and Ioannis Kaplanis, Spatial
Economics Research Centre Discussion Paper
No. 66 (http://www.spatialeconomics.ac.uk/
textonly/SERC/publications/download/
sercdp0066.pdf).
Paul Cheshire, Christian Hilber and
Ioannis Kaplanis are all researchers at 
the Spatial Economics Research Centre 
(http://www.spatialeconomics.ac.uk) based 
at LSE.
Further reading
Paul Cheshire and Stephen Sheppard (2002)
‘Welfare Economics of Land Use Regulation’,
Journal of Urban Economics 52: 242-69
Paul Cheshire and Christian Hilber (2008)
‘Office Space Supply Restrictions in Britain:
The Political Economy of Market Revenge’,
Economic Journal 118: F185-221
HM Treasury/BIS (2011) The Plan 
for Growth (cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
2011budget_growth.pdf)
Raffaella Sadun (2008) ‘Does Planning
Regulation Protect Independent Retailers?’,
CentrePiece (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/
publications/abstract.asp?index=3217)
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